This is a reminder that there are just nineteen days left to provide your answer in The MineThatData Measuring Advertising Effectiveness Challenge. This is an exercise to help the multichannel retailing industry measure the impact of catalogs, postcards and e-mails simultaneously delivered to various customer audiences. This link has been the most visited link on this blog. I already have one solution, and am looking forward to more by the 1/31/2007 deadline.
Helping CEOs Understand How Customers Interact With Advertising, Products, Brands, and Channels
January 12, 2007
January 11, 2007
"Either Get On The Train, Or Get Out Of The Way"
Those were the words of noted blogger Jeremiah Owyang, a very bright and intelligent individual, when talking about a journalist feeling frustration over the conflict between journalism and blogging. Jeremiah's advice is to "either get on the train, or get out of the way".
In multichannel retailing, a similar phenomenon is occurring to the one Jeremiah references. A generation of employees who developed their skills in the world of catalogs are being phased out by Google and the magic of online retailing. No longer is it necessary to send a 148 page catalog to a customer, when you can simply intercept the customer at her time of need by allowing Google to broker a fair competition between online retailers.
The catalog expert is in a similar situation to the journalist that Jeremiah describes. Over the past decade, her profession was consumed by an economic version of Darwinian evolution. Her skills, once so important, must evolve for her to remain relevant.
If you have the battle scars of an individual who went through the type of economic transition that Jeremiah describes, what did you do to make the transition occur? Did you get on the train, did you get out of the way, or did you allow the train to run you over?
Let's hope that the current generation of online marketers, social media experts, and online strategists are ready to make the same type of transition when the next version of the internet consumes the very industries they currently promote. Since everything is happening faster and faster, the lights on the next train are already approaching.
In multichannel retailing, a similar phenomenon is occurring to the one Jeremiah references. A generation of employees who developed their skills in the world of catalogs are being phased out by Google and the magic of online retailing. No longer is it necessary to send a 148 page catalog to a customer, when you can simply intercept the customer at her time of need by allowing Google to broker a fair competition between online retailers.
The catalog expert is in a similar situation to the journalist that Jeremiah describes. Over the past decade, her profession was consumed by an economic version of Darwinian evolution. Her skills, once so important, must evolve for her to remain relevant.
If you have the battle scars of an individual who went through the type of economic transition that Jeremiah describes, what did you do to make the transition occur? Did you get on the train, did you get out of the way, or did you allow the train to run you over?
Let's hope that the current generation of online marketers, social media experts, and online strategists are ready to make the same type of transition when the next version of the internet consumes the very industries they currently promote. Since everything is happening faster and faster, the lights on the next train are already approaching.
January 10, 2007
An Envigorating 310 Minute Drive Home From Work
Seattle and the adjoining metropolitan area, population 3.3 million, is not prepared for natural disasters. So when a couple of inches of snow hit King County at 4:30pm on a sleepy Wednesday afternoon, our clogged transportation system went into cardiac arrest.
Like any good solider, I left work at 5:00pm. Just ten blocks from work at 5:50pm, I dug in for the journey of a lifetime.
The twenty-eight mile ride home took just under five hours and fifteen minutes. Road closures, an inch of ice, jack-knifed semis, cars sliding into ditches, buses with school children stranded along the highway, chain reaction accidents, several hundred cars abandoned --- some right in the middle of the freeway, hardy pioneers walking home from their abandoned cars in shorts, you name it, I saw it.
We didn't get cheated at my house. There's a good nine to twelve inches of snow here. Now that I finished eating dinner at 10:57pm, it is time to go outside, and shovel some snow.
Like any good solider, I left work at 5:00pm. Just ten blocks from work at 5:50pm, I dug in for the journey of a lifetime.
The twenty-eight mile ride home took just under five hours and fifteen minutes. Road closures, an inch of ice, jack-knifed semis, cars sliding into ditches, buses with school children stranded along the highway, chain reaction accidents, several hundred cars abandoned --- some right in the middle of the freeway, hardy pioneers walking home from their abandoned cars in shorts, you name it, I saw it.
We didn't get cheated at my house. There's a good nine to twelve inches of snow here. Now that I finished eating dinner at 10:57pm, it is time to go outside, and shovel some snow.
January 09, 2007
Endless: A Shoe And Handbag Business Courtesy Of Amazon.com
Amazon recently unvieled a new e-commerce business called Endless. Featuring fashionable handbags and shoes, Endless uses a new hook to compete against multichannel retailers like Macy's and online pureplays like Zappos. The hook: Free Next Day Shipping!! Order an item at 1:00pm on a Tuesday afternoon, and you'll have it on Wednesday.
In case you haven't walked into your local UPS store, attempting to ship a product cross-country via next day air, the proposition is not inexpensive. How can this business compete? The following numbers are for illustrative purposes only --- the numbers are not intended to reflect absolute reality at any of the retailers in the example. However, the numbers should be adequate for a directional argument.
Let's assume you are an aspiring woman hoping to purchase the Jessica Simpson Dawson Satchel via an online business. You narrow your choices down to Endless, Zappos and Macy's.
Assuming you live in a state that has a six percent sales tax, the total price for the same item, including tax and shipping, is $248 at Endless, $251.95 at Zappos, and a whopping $281.91 at Macy's. The item will arrive tomorrow from Endless, in three to five days from Zappos, and in five to eleven days from Macy's.
Given these choices, the logical choice is for the customer to purchase the item at Endless.
Can Endless make money doing this? It is possible. At the end of this post, I include a sample profit and loss statement for each company.
The punchline is this: In order for each company to generate the same level of profit from this item, Endless needs to sell 1,000 units, Zappos needs to sell 741 units, and Macy's needs to sell 491 units. If Amazon has efficiencies that make their expense structure cheaper than Zappos or Macy's, the number of units decrease.
Amazon is betting that the Endless business model will cause customers to be 30% more productive than Zappos, and 100% more productive than Macy's, using these assumptions. This gets Endless to a break-even scenario, most likely, on a fixed-cost basis, and generates the same number of dollars of variable profit as Zappos and Macy's.
What do you think? Do you think customers will flock to Endless to take advantage of free next day shipping? Who will be hurt more by this strategy, Zappos, who is directly competing on total price, or Macy's, who has a retail channel that essentially provide "free shipping same day"??
Sample Profit And Loss Statement
In case you haven't walked into your local UPS store, attempting to ship a product cross-country via next day air, the proposition is not inexpensive. How can this business compete? The following numbers are for illustrative purposes only --- the numbers are not intended to reflect absolute reality at any of the retailers in the example. However, the numbers should be adequate for a directional argument.
Let's assume you are an aspiring woman hoping to purchase the Jessica Simpson Dawson Satchel via an online business. You narrow your choices down to Endless, Zappos and Macy's.
Assuming you live in a state that has a six percent sales tax, the total price for the same item, including tax and shipping, is $248 at Endless, $251.95 at Zappos, and a whopping $281.91 at Macy's. The item will arrive tomorrow from Endless, in three to five days from Zappos, and in five to eleven days from Macy's.
Given these choices, the logical choice is for the customer to purchase the item at Endless.
Can Endless make money doing this? It is possible. At the end of this post, I include a sample profit and loss statement for each company.
The punchline is this: In order for each company to generate the same level of profit from this item, Endless needs to sell 1,000 units, Zappos needs to sell 741 units, and Macy's needs to sell 491 units. If Amazon has efficiencies that make their expense structure cheaper than Zappos or Macy's, the number of units decrease.
Amazon is betting that the Endless business model will cause customers to be 30% more productive than Zappos, and 100% more productive than Macy's, using these assumptions. This gets Endless to a break-even scenario, most likely, on a fixed-cost basis, and generates the same number of dollars of variable profit as Zappos and Macy's.
What do you think? Do you think customers will flock to Endless to take advantage of free next day shipping? Who will be hurt more by this strategy, Zappos, who is directly competing on total price, or Macy's, who has a retail channel that essentially provide "free shipping same day"??
Sample Profit And Loss Statement
| Jessica Simpson Dawson Satchel Price Elasticity And Profitability | |||
| Endless.com | Zappos.com | Macys.com | |
| Item Price | $248.00 | $251.95 | $248.00 |
| Shipping/Handling | $0.00 | $0.00 | $17.95 |
| Salex Tax (6%) | $0.00 | $0.00 | $15.96 |
| Total Cost | $248.00 | $251.95 | $281.91 |
| Delivery Time | 1 Day | 3 - 5 Days | 5 - 11 Days |
| Estimated Units | 1,000 | 741 | 491 |
| Demand | $248,000 | $186,695 | $121,768 |
| Net Fulfilled (90% of Demand) | $223,200 | $168,025 | $109,591 |
| Less Returns (30% of Demand) | ($66,960) | ($50,408) | ($32,877) |
| Net Sales | $156,240 | $117,618 | $76,714 |
| Gross Margin (50% of NS) | $78,120 | $58,809 | $38,357 |
| Less Marketing | ($18,000) | ($18,000) | ($18,000) |
| Less Picking & Packing (20% of NS) | ($31,248) | ($23,524) | ($15,343) |
| Shipping Expense/Item | $17.50 | $8.00 | $5.00 |
| Less Shipping Expense | ($17,500) | ($5,928) | ($2,455) |
| Plus Shipping Income | $0 | $0 | $8,813 |
| Variable Operating Profit | $11,372 | $11,357 | $11,373 |
| Profit as a % of Net Sales | 7.3% | 9.7% | 14.8% |
| Profit per Item Sold | $11.37 | $15.33 | $23.16 |
| Ad to Sales Ratio | 11.5% | 15.3% | 23.5% |
January 08, 2007
Sears Launches In Second Life
Steve Rubel at Micro Persuasion shares with us that Sears has joined other retailers in setting up shop in Second Life. This isn't an announcement about a sexy brand like Starbucks. This is Sears. Two year ago, could you have imagined this happening? Our world is changing.
Saks Fifth Avenue E-Mail Campaign
Today, I received the following e-mail from Saks Fifth Avenue, sent to their e-mail subscriber list. There were tabs above this image that the customer could click through to visit specific merchandise divisions. However, the title of the e-mail was "Presenting A Fresh New Face Of Saks Fifth Avenue", so the purpose of the e-mail was to specifically tell customers that there is a new logo --- "Presenting our latest logo, a classic script rendered with a fresh, new face".
Saks has been around for an awfully long time, so they obviously know what they are doing. I guess I am confused how I, as a customer, benefit from this announcement. I am also confused as to how Saks sells more merchandise because of this announcement. What do you think?
January 07, 2007
Blockbuster Verses Netflix: Multichannel Forensics
Blockbuster's PR folks are doing a good job getting the word out that they are gaining ground in their battle with Netflix. A series of articles are circulating the press, including this one from Forbes. Blockbuster claims to have 2.0 million paying online subscribers, compared with the 5.7 million that subscribe to Netflix.
Financial documents from both Blockbuster and Netflix tell us the story of online and retail sales, during the third quarter of 2006 verses 2005. Some of these numbers may be a comparison of apples and oranges, especially given retail closures associated with Blockbuster. They can still be used for illustrative purposes.
Blockbuster claims that retail rental revenue decreased due to expense management associated with closing poorly performing real estate locations.
Between the two businesses, total volume increased by six percent in the third quarter, suggesting an expanding market, or suggesting that Netflix is taking market share from other competitors.
Multichannel forensics come into play for Blockbuster when evaluating the growth of the online subscriber base. If these subscribers are simply retail customers who are converting to the online channel, Blockbuster may have a series of additional future challenges.
By offering in-store dropoff and pickup of online movies, Blockbuster may stem loss of customers to Netflix. This strategy may allow Blockbuster to slow the rate at which Netflix is growing its customer base via customer acquisition. Given that Netflix likely has an annual customer retention rate of around seventy percent, Netflix must really amp-up the customer acquisition activity in order to continue the torrid growth rate Netflix has achieved.
If, however, Blockbuster is simply shifting its own retail rentals to an online subscription channel, then a very interesting set of dynamics shift into play. Can Blockbuster drive more visits to the store under this model? Management seems to think so. If this results in fewer visits to the store that result in a purchase, fixed store costs may not leverage as well, requiring Blockbuster to make a series of decisions about the true incremental value of the online initiative. It is possible that sales decrease in all stores, resulting in the eventual closure of underperforming stores. This could eventually lead to a more profitable business model, assuming Netflix doesn't clobber Blockbuster during this period of transition.
Stay tuned. Both companies appear to be moving their chess pieces around the board. Both executive teams must be feeling the stress of this multichannel verses online pureplay battle. Who do you think will win?
Financial documents from both Blockbuster and Netflix tell us the story of online and retail sales, during the third quarter of 2006 verses 2005. Some of these numbers may be a comparison of apples and oranges, especially given retail closures associated with Blockbuster. They can still be used for illustrative purposes.
| Comparison of Rental Income, Online and Retail | |||
| Blockbuster Verses Netflix, in Millions | |||
| Third Quarter Results | |||
| 2006 | 2005 | Change | |
| Blockbuster Retail | $676.0 | $726.5 | -7.0% |
| Blockbuster Online | $64.7 | $41.0 | 57.8% |
| Netflix Online | $256.0 | $172.7 | 48.2% |
| Totals | $996.7 | $940.2 | 6.0% |
| Blockbuster Total | $740.7 | $767.5 | -3.5% |
| Netflix Total | $256.0 | $172.7 | 48.2% |
| Blockbuster To Netflix Ratio | 2.893 | 4.444 | -34.9% |
Blockbuster claims that retail rental revenue decreased due to expense management associated with closing poorly performing real estate locations.
Between the two businesses, total volume increased by six percent in the third quarter, suggesting an expanding market, or suggesting that Netflix is taking market share from other competitors.
Multichannel forensics come into play for Blockbuster when evaluating the growth of the online subscriber base. If these subscribers are simply retail customers who are converting to the online channel, Blockbuster may have a series of additional future challenges.
By offering in-store dropoff and pickup of online movies, Blockbuster may stem loss of customers to Netflix. This strategy may allow Blockbuster to slow the rate at which Netflix is growing its customer base via customer acquisition. Given that Netflix likely has an annual customer retention rate of around seventy percent, Netflix must really amp-up the customer acquisition activity in order to continue the torrid growth rate Netflix has achieved.
If, however, Blockbuster is simply shifting its own retail rentals to an online subscription channel, then a very interesting set of dynamics shift into play. Can Blockbuster drive more visits to the store under this model? Management seems to think so. If this results in fewer visits to the store that result in a purchase, fixed store costs may not leverage as well, requiring Blockbuster to make a series of decisions about the true incremental value of the online initiative. It is possible that sales decrease in all stores, resulting in the eventual closure of underperforming stores. This could eventually lead to a more profitable business model, assuming Netflix doesn't clobber Blockbuster during this period of transition.
Stay tuned. Both companies appear to be moving their chess pieces around the board. Both executive teams must be feeling the stress of this multichannel verses online pureplay battle. Who do you think will win?
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