Marketplaces

They're as old as the Bible.

This book (click here) is a classic from the dot.com era. The authors explain how industries evolve and change. Think about catalog marketing, once dominated by the likes of Sears and JCP and Montgomery Wards among others. Everything consolidated to a handful of gatekeepers. Then "specialty catalogers" ... the Lands' End and LL Beans of the world, they took away market share. There were thousands of small (and some large) catalog brands. Eventually the large catalog brands expanded into retail/malls (i.e. marketplaces).

Then ecommerce came along. Thousands or tens of thousands of small companies erupted, taking market share from catalogers. Catalog brands folded. Ecommerce ultimately rolled-up into large marketplaces (Amazon ... Shopify ... Etsy etc).

What do we think happens when we transition from ecommerce to something that is AI-inspired? Do you honestly think that Amazon will be the big winner? Or do you think that something comes up, something we didn't expect, and that "something" does "something new" better than incumbents? 

It's likely to be the latter.

This is more about what happens to "brands". They grow, they thrive, they struggle, they die. It's unavoidable.

Your "boutique brand", however, can adhere to a different set of rules. That little Italian restaurant on the corner has been around for three decades. They've survived all changes. How did they do that? Why do you keep going there?

Yes, there are going to be grifters that sink the economy as they try to force their version of AI upon us. We've seen an endless supply of grifters in the last quarter century ... the Enrons, the Mortgage Backed Security purveyors, and in the past decade politicians. It's going to be an awful experience in ecommerce to wade through the grifters. But we'll do it. Everybody always does it.

Your "boutique brand" doesn't have to adhere to the migration from the marketplaces that dominate the 2020s to the marketplaces that will be created for the 2030s. Plan accordingly, and have a vision for what is best for your customers.

ROAS = Profit (It's Just Harder To See It)

There are (too) many digital marketers who, when you talk to them about profit, say that they don't measure profit. "I don't need to measure profit, I measure ROAS, ROAS is a best practice".

The fun part of the comment is that the digital marketer IS measuring profit, s/he just doesn't realize it.

Here's a table for a digital marketing initiative, broken down into deciles for the sake of illustration.

We see total results on the left - I converted the results to incremental outcomes by decile. In this example, deciles 7/8/9/10 lost money, they were unprofitable.

Now look at Incremental ROAS on the far right. An approximate Incremental ROAS of $2.25 is unprofitable. Anything below that is unprofitable.

If you have the discipline to keep incremental activities above a 2.25 ROAS, you're generating profit. Good for you!

The Report Lies To You

Non-catalog readers, take the day off.

Once again, I share these images to show you just how wonked-up AI actually is. Spelling errors. Missing legs. If it's this wonked-up with a simple cartoon, imagine what else the gurus are trusting that in reality is completely borked?

But I digress.

Last week a member of the #printisback community on LinkedIn decided that #brands need to go back to 1996, as if J. Peterman were about to publish the Urban Sombrero on the cover.

The root of the lie being told to you is called "Matchback Reporting". Matchbacks ignore incrementality. Those who believe in Matchback Reporting ignore reality.

Time for a parable. Remember when I told you a member of the retargeting community took me to lunch, and for the cost of a Caesar Salad wanted me to convince the Management Team at a large retail brand that because 95% of ecommerce customers saw at least one of his ads he deserved credit for 95% of ecommerce orders (over $300,000,000 in annual sales) and he wanted a percentage of each transaction. If he presented those facts to you, a smart cataloger, you'd say "hey, Goober, get out you Lemonhead." Then you'd go back to your cubicle, pull out your Matchback Report, and perform the EXACT SAME ANALYSIS AS GOOBER DID and treat it as Gospel. You'd think that Goober was an idiot, you'd view you as a savvy marketer. And yet? You're the same person, doing the same thing, sans Caesar Salad.

Let's assume that your catalog is active across a four-week period. Let's assume you were going to mail your entire twelve-month customer file. You randomly select 50,000 customers to be in the mailed segment, you randomly select 50,000 customers to be in your no-mail / holdout segment.

You then sum all demand across all marketing channels for the four weeks when the catalog is active. Compute an average (i.e. divide each sum by the 50,000 customers in the segment). You'll produce a table that looks like this:

This is the way test results generally look. If you don't mail a catalog, your call center is quiet as 78 year olds cannot call you if they don't have a catalog in their hand. Website / Direct Load is where most demand happens, most of the demand will happen if you don't mail the catalog. Email Marketing is usually not impacted by catalogs, though your mileage will vary. Search is a channel that is clearly impacted by catalogs - catalogs cause customers to search for competing products (both a strength and a weakness of catalog marketing because your dumb catalog drives your smart customers to the competition). Social is almost never impacted by catalogs - completely different audiences.

The magic in the table happens in the Total Demand column.

Your matchback reporting takes full credit for the $5.65 of total demand. It ignores what would have happened if the catalog were never mailed. If the catalog were never mailed, the $5.65 total becomes $4.25 ... not $0, but $4.25.

Here's what the p&l might look like for the $5.65 figure.

Everything looks good here ... you appear to generate $1.54 profit per catalog/book ... in modern parlance you generate a ROAS of 7.53. It's the 7.53 figure that the #printisback community on LinkedIn like to refer to ... it's a much higher number than that 3.88 figure you get for paid search or 2.97 for paid social or ... wait ... they never quote email marketing because email marketing has the best ROAS, period.

Remember - your holdout group did $4.25, not zero. Take the control / holdout group average ($4.25), divide it by the mailed group average ($5.65), and you get 75%.

This means that 75% of what is outlined on the matchback report is a lie. A fabrication. It would have happened had the catalog not been mailed ... and you know this is true because in the table YOU DIDN'T MAIL THE CUSTOMERS IN THE HOLDOUT GROUP!!!!

We cannot run the p&L on the $5.65 that is likely reported in your matchback report. We have to run it on the incremental total ... $1.40 ... which is (1 - 75% = 25%) of the $5.65 total.

The p&l changes, friends.

This is where things get really dicey. The incremental outcome (a loss of $0.18 per catalog) is REALITY. The matchback-reported totals column of $1.54 profit is FANTASY.

On LinkedIn, the #printisback community communicates FANTASY results to you, misrepresenting the outcome as reality.

It's pretty obvious why they'd do this.

• $5.65 per book / $1.54 profit = Best ROI, which means you should hire them.
• $1.40 per book / ($0.18 profit) = It might be time to shut down your catalog division.

When I communicate (via analysis of thousands ... seriously ... of catalog mail/holdout tests across 36 years) what a smart catalog brand should be doing, I'm generally derided by the #printisback community, and for good reason. I want you to do what is most profitable for your business, they want you to do what is most profitable for their business. Do you see the distinction there?

So, yes, the #printisback community is probably right ... I'm not one of them as they tell my clients.

But I'm on your side. I want you to be as profitable as possible. Matchback reports lie to you, and somebody has to communicate that to you.

Feeling Special

I gave a presentation in 2016, in front of about 1,500 people. I spent nearly an hour explaining to the audience how running an ecommerce brand would become comparable to running a sports franchise.

The audience was not impressed.

I do recall a pair of Associate Athletic Directors working for FCS Colleges reaching out to me to suggest I "had it right" - they suggested their world was heading in this direction as well. My industry didn't agree, these people who weren't in the industry believed in the thesis.

Here we are, in 2026.

As you can see, AI has a way to go. That's a catastrophic effort at creating a cartoon for me. And you need to see the cartoon to understand AI limitations. How will you know when AI completely butchers your marketing efforts? It's going to happen, and it's going to be spectacular.

Last year I stood in a luxury store with an Executive. The Executive told me to watch the customer. The customer was spending somewhere north of $5,000 ... and she had a glow that reached from Phoenix to El Paso. It was the kind of glow an Eagles fan might feel after beating the Cowboys 34-28 on a last-second touchdown pass.

The customer felt special.

The theoretical Eagles fan would feel special.

It isn't hard to see the future of ecommerce bifurcate.

1. AI-Agents shopping on your behalf at AI-Marketplaces. That's cold and boring and sterile.
2. Brands who make customers feel special.

To get back to the sports analogy, you're probably going to hire a General Manager at some point in the future.

• AI-Marketplace Director reports to this person.
• AI-Agent Director reports to this person.
• Ecommerce Director reports to this person.
• Creative Director reports to this person.
• Website Operations reports to this person.
• Digital Marketing Team reports to this person.
• Merchandise/Marketing Communicator (Director) reports to this person.
• Analytics Team reports to this person.

The General Manager (GM) brings everything together. She's not unlike Billy Beane in Moneyball. She has three major job functions.

• Partner with merchandising/inventory leadership to put the best products in the best situations to have the best outcomes ... similar to what a baseball GM does with A / AA / AAA / Major League players. There's a development plan for each player. There needs to be a development plan with winning/new merchandise that is marketing-driven.
• Lead the company into the future with AI, setting aside all the hype and grifting, focusing on what matters to customers.
• Make customers feel special. This doesn't mean offering somebody 40% off. This doesn't mean triple-loyalty-points. This likely means creating digital and offline events that fill an emotional need with the customer. This isn't fundamentally different than six Saturday home game afternoons during the College Football season.

There are going to be new companies that create the AI-Marketplaces of the future. We have no idea who those companies are (they likely don't exist yet or they have 11 employees), we don't know what AI-Marketplaces will look like. We don't. Anybody who tells you they know is a Thought Leader. We will need a General Manager position to cut though the grifting that will happen or is currently happening. 

The GM needs to also make customers feel special.

Spend An Hour With Me. And Daniel. And Aaron. On Monday

Join Daniel/Aaron from Orita.ai and I on Monday at 4:30pm EDT / 1:30pm PDT as we talk about ecommerce and bridging the gap between Executives and those of us with facts that need to be acted upon.

Click Here, now!!

In 1992 Your Promotion From Analyst To Manager Was Published in DMNews

By 1994 my promotion wasn't published anymore. By 2026 you self-published your promotion on LinkedIn (and earned 77 "likes").

But 1992?

In 1992 you'd submit org structure changes to DMNews so that you could communicate to the entire Catalog Industry just how sophisticated your intentions were.

• "LL Bean announced today the promotion of Shannon Ellison to Director of Circulation. She brings with her nearly eight years of experience. Ellison mentioned that she's '... looking forward to partnering with our printer to bring perfect binding to the Christmas catalog'. At press time, LL Bean has not decided whether the Christmas catalog will be 256 pages or 260 pages."

These announcements meant something. There was actual gossip ... "do you think LL Bean could go to 264 pages, I mean, Ellison likes a meaty assortment from what I've heard." I recall our restructure in 1992 to a "Customer Planning and Development" framework (or maybe we left that framework, I don't know). We announced a new Director and new Managers. My goodness, the stimulating conversations as LL Bean and Lands' End held an "exchange" meeting (to exchange names with each other) in room 318 at the Marriott during the Catalog Conference, with 18 people (including 6 actual employees from LL Bean and Lands' End paired with 12 kind vendor-supporting staffers) sitting around two queen beds negotiating the trade of 1.6 million names at $0.005 each.

Twenty years later? All of it ... gone. All of it. Replaced by Google.

Imagine everything that exists today ... gone in 2046. It's going to happen.

Viable Assortment

Here's one of the optional analytics that I might add to a Top 12 project ... I call it the "Viable Assortment".

• Viable Assortment = The Number of Items/Styles You Sell That Generate Enough Volume To Be In The Top 90% of Your Sales Assortment (Annually).

The items in the bottom ten percent of your assortment are just rubble ... stuff that is being cleared out, stuff you sold three years ago and 17 customers still love it.

The items in the top 90% of your assortment are your "Viable Assortment". It's what customers care about.

Here's a company that is failing. Here is their "Viable Assortment".

• End of 2025:  1,206 Items, Price = $18.20, Average Sales/Item = $15,520.
• End of 2024:  1,158 Items, Price = $15.21, Average Sales/Item = $19,892.
• End of 2023:  1,335 Items, Price = $15.72, Average Sales/Item = $18,471.
• End of 2022:  1,573 Items, Price = $16.34, Average Sales/Item = $16,273.

Weeeeeeee!

Among the Viable Assortment, this brand jacked up prices (or introduced expensive items ... hint hint), driving down Sales/Item in the process. And compared to three years ago, we see that the Viable Assortment is 20% SMALLER than it is today. Bad. Not smart. That's 370 fewer items generating at least $15,520 less ... that's $5.7 million that evaporated due to a smaller Viable Assortment.

Do you measure your Viable Assortment?

It can be part of the "bonus analysis" that is included in the Top 12 Project ... contact me now (kevinh@minethatdata.com) to take advantage of the introductory offer for prior clients and blog subscribers ... offer ends August 15.

So You Aren't Selling

This comes up from time-to-time ... "don't talk to me about selling my business, I'm not remotely interested in selling my business.

Fair enough.

However.

What do you want your business to look like in three years?

Example. You currently manage a $60,000,000 brand that earns 5% pre-tax profit. Yes, three million dollars of pre-tax profit is nice. No, you're not happy with that level of performance, for obvious reasons. When your vendors charge you more and sales don't increase, you no longer earn 5% pre-tax profit, do you? In other words, what does you business need to look like three years from now ... what does "healthy" look like in the context of your brand?

Do you still want to be a $60,000,000 business? Unlikely. You probably want to be a $75,000,000 business in three years. If that's the case, how many new customers do you need to get there? How much does merchandise productivity need to improve to get there? Are there marketing channels you under-utilize ... should you "utilize" them better, and if so, what is the roadmap to get there? Do you need to personalize the assortment of your home page and landing pages to please customers with specific merchandise preferences, or do you let the customer hunt-and-peck their way to what they want to buy? Do you have enough newness in your merchandise assortment to please your loyal customer base so they keep spending $$$ with you? How long do you have to hold on to winning product so that you extract maximum profit from each winning item ... is it two years, five years?

If somebody were considering buying your brand, they'd ask all of these questions ... you'd have to have answers to the questions, credible answers, not theory.

Here's the thing ... if you identify what you want your business to look like in three years, you'll take steps between now and three years from now that get you to where you want to be in the future. It's a strategic plan of sorts. You're essentially going through the process that somebody who wants to sell their brand for $$$ goes through years prior to selling.

• The $60,000,000 brand earning 5% pre-tax profit might fetch an imaginary $15,000,000.
• Spending three years to get the brand to $75,000,000 and 10% pre-tax profit might fetch an imaginary $35,000,000 at the same multiple ... might fetch a higher multiple as well.

You're probably saying "this doesn't matter, we're not selling, Goober". Ok. How many of you have a bonus structure? Say you are a Director at your ecommerce brand earning $150,000 a year and a 30% bonus if you meet your financial goals. Do you want to earn a half-bonus of $22,500 for a middling business generating 5% pre-tax profit, or do you want to earn a full-bonus of $45,000 for helping get your brand to 10% pre-tax profit?

For most of you, there is a financial incentive (via bonuses) to view your business as if you were getting it ready to be sold in three years.

Or ... keep doing what you've been doing.

Top 12 Analysis: Impact of Pricing

One of the analyses I run in a pricing project is measurement of customer response by price point. If inexpensive price point customers are willing to buy expensive price point items in the future, you're in good shape? If not? You need to maintain price integrity.

I'll run logistic regression models (#oldschool) of next year's response within price point bands ... always a fun and informative analysis!

The table shows the increase in rebuy rates ... for instance, if a customer buys from the low price point band, each item purchased there increases your probability of buying in the future regardless of price point band ... but adds the most in low prices and average prices.

Interestingly (in this case) if the customer buys from the highest price point band, the customer is most likely to keep buying in the highest price point band next year, though the purchase does help increase odds of buying in all price point bands.

There are companies I analyze that have all sorts of odd outcomes ... low price point customers that refuse to move up, high price point customers who buy from everything, average price point customers who default back to low price point bands. Regardless, it's important information you need to learn for your brand.

It's one of the Top 12 Analyses you respond to when we work together on a project! You have a few days left to take me up on my Top 12 offer. Contact me now (kevinh@minethatdata.com).

Alternate Facts

Midland Paper thinks you need to read this article (click here). They included the article in a newsletter this week.

Is there a rise in Slow Commerce? I asked one of the AI apps to tell me about Slow Commerce. Surely if it were a trend, AI would know about it, right?

Here's another AI application.

In 2026, there is an abundance of data showing that catalog marketing was harmed deeply by ecommerce, then had the doors blown off of it by the paper/printing industry, who constrained supply, raised prices, and fired my clients ... pushing the marketing channel to the brink unless you have the marketing budget of a Zombie Retailer or Amazon.

If an abundance of facts/data doesn't align with your worldview, it's fashionable to create alternate facts. You see it in politics every day.

Thing is, Midland Paper doesn't need to peddle opinions dressed up as facts. They have clients. They have success stories.

If they think Slow Commerce is a trend, why not show an example? Show people what Trader Joe's is doing - even if you don't directly work with them. They sent me sixteen pages of homespun commerce today.

There's even a crossword puzzle at the back of that thing. Old school.

I realize it's a lot more fun to get on an airplane and meet with the creative folks at a Zombie Retailer ... they're willing to waste tens of thousands of dollars on branding, not expecting a penny of sales in return. Who wouldn't like that kind of business? Of course, maybe that's why they're Zombie Retailers, but that's a story for another day.

For today, no need for alternate facts when reality is delivered from a company like Trader Joes.

Top 12 Analysis: Merchandise Gravity

This one is always a classic ... every one of you manages customers who ultimately gravitate toward specific merchandise categories or exhibit behavior that becomes actionable from a targeting standpoint.

I use what is called a "Factor Analysis" to reduce complicated customer behavior into actionable segments. The computer produces a visualization for me ... the visualization is what so many of you have enjoyed over the past twenty years, making the visualization one of the Top 12 Analyses I perform.

So many fun associations!

Customers buying for the first time lean to one-item orders (duh), which skew to expensive items. Yup.

Customers buying from Merchandise Category 02 tend to buy items below their average historical price point. This brand is discounting within that category, it's something I'd have to discuss with Management to understand if they were liquidating items or ... well ... just to figure out if they had a plan.

As customers become loyal (3rd / 4th / 5th / 6th-9th purchase) they align with new merchandise. Guess what? This one comes up frequently. Give your best customers want they want for crying out loud!!!!

My Top 12 Offer ($12,000 instead of $19,000) is valid for prior clients and blog subscribers through August 15. Contact me (kevinh@minethatdata.com) for details.

Top 12 Analysis: The Most Popular Table I've Ever Created

I started creating this analysis (Class Of Reporting) for clients back in 2012, rolled it out more formally in the 2013-2014 timeframe.

In nearly every project where this table provides enlightening insights, clients talk about the table ... a lot.

It's not all great talk. I shared the table with an Owner about a decade ago. A few weeks later the Chief Merchandising Officer calls me ... "your analysis got me fired". No, the analysis didn't get him fired, he got himself fired because the analysis revealed the fact the merchant was unable to effectively manage a merchandise assortment.

Through the years, the analysis remains relevant and actionable. In 2026, you'd be amazed how few ecommerce brands look at their business this way.

The merchant is failing this brand. New items went from 3,146 three years ago to 2,180 in the past year. This tactic "can" work if new items are more productive. In this case, they're not more productive. New item demand dropped from $14.6 million two years ago to $8.1 million in the past year. Unacceptable.

Look at the price of new items in the past year ... $20.80 vs. $15.23 the year prior. Chaotic management of pricing tiers.

These trends repeat all the time.

These trends get marketers fired all the time. The marketer does nothing wrong (well, the marketer should run this analysis), sales decrease, traffic decreases, and the merchant blames the marketing team for not generating enough traffic. The story has nothing to do with "traffic". It has to do with mismanagement of the merchandise assortment.

When one drills down by category, more truth is revealed.

This is the most popular table in my project work ... by far ... it's not even close. It can be yours, part of the Top 12 Analysis ... with pricing locked in at $12,000 through August 15. Contact me now (kevinh@minethatdata.com) for details.

Top 12 Analysis: Customer Life Cycle

Here's one of the analyses that "some" clients really appreciate. What you see below isn't the full analysis, it's a portion of the table with easy-to-understand metrics.

Every business has a "DNA", a hard-written code that dictates where the brand goes. The brand depicted above possesses the classic "discounting" DNA. It's a lazy, stupid brand (it's from my "Beans: The Internet's Largest Variety Store" study).

As the customer matures, AOV increases from about $42 at a first order to $48 after ten orders. On the surface, this should be a good thing. It's not. We can see that the increase in AOV is manufactured. Look at Average Margin Value (margin dollars per order). We start at $29, loyal customers finish at $31. AOV increases by 14% as the customer becomes more loyal. AMV increases by just 6% as the customer becomes more loyal. The brand (like so many) is creating empty calories ... discounting to get the customer to spend more, not pushing gross margin far enough in the process (and hint - that's what matters).

Look at the percentage of an order that is represented by new merchandise.

• 1st Order = 40%.
• 11th+ Order = 63%.

A first-time buyer wants to purchase what is trusted (or what Google trusts - which is an interesting distinction). A loyal buyer wants to be excited by newness. This should shake you to your core, causing you to re-evaluate everything you do from a marketing standpoint.

Look at the percentage of an order that is represented by full-priced merchandise.

• 1st Order = 79%.
• 11th+ Order = 66%.

We can see that the brand gives away more to loyal buyers, which marketing pundits LOVE to do. Of course, marketing pundits are WRONG, but that's a story for another day.

I have a client who acted upon this information ... they trigger their email campaigns based on the knowledge gained in a Customer Life Cycle analysis. No batch-and-blast for everybody. Just smart merchandising to individual customers.

My offer stands ... act by August 15 and you get my Top 12 Analysis framework for $12,000. Contact me now (kevinh@minethatdata.com).

Top 12 Analysis: The Life Table

Recall that I've collected the twelve analyses that you consistently get the most use out of ... these are the analytics you take action on, they are the analytics that you ask the most questions about on video conferences.

We'll start with the Life Table. The Life Table measures how customers convert from a first purchase to a second purchase ... 2nd to 3rd purchase ... 3rd to 4th purchase ... 4th to 5th purchase.

It can be hard to interpret a nerdy table ... so let's look at a graph that measures when this brand (Beans - The Internet's Only Variety Store) converts a first-time buyer to a second purchase. Tell me what you observe.

Do you see the problem? 

I sure do!

Anytime incremental monthly rebuy rates (i.e. chance of buying in month six given the customer has not purchased in months 0/1/2/3/4/5) dips below 1.0%, the customer is unresponsive/dormant.

When does a first-time buyer become unresponsive?

• Three Months After a First Purchase!

That's unacceptable!

There are two reasons for this ... both can happen at the same time.

1. The brand sells merchandise that is repurchased seasonally, negating timeframes when other brands are able to convert the customer to a second purchase.
2. The marketing team does not implement the right tools to convert the customer to a second purchase (i.e. batch-and-blast campaigns with the same presentation to all customers, poor paid search campaigns, poor organic social efforts).

We can also see that this brand fails to push customers to loyal status. Look at the original table at the top of the post, measuring rebuy rates after a year.

• 1x Buyer:  15.5% Rebuy Rate.
• 2x Buyer:  25.5% Rebuy Rate.
• 3x Buyer:  34.8% Rebuy Rate.
• 4x Buyer:  44.7% Rebuy Rate.

Rebuy rates need to exceed 60% after four purchases.

The Life Table quickly points out problem spots in the customer development process. Is it any wonder this is one of your favorite analyses??

Contact me (kevinh@minethatdata.com) for your own Top 12 Analysis (introductory offer of $12,000 lasts through August 15).