June 09, 2015

Blue Nile - Omnichannel

It's called a "webroom" (click here).

The omnichannel community sees this as the sunset of true e-commerce.

Might we think about things a bit more strategically?

Have you read the Blue Nile 10-K (click here)? You read this stuff, don't you? You don't just trust trade journalists and research brands and consultants ... you actually read what the company says, right? Right?!!

Growth is slowing (at a fast pace) ... gross margins are in perpetual erosion ... marketing costs are increasing ... and profit is 4th lowest in the 5 years displayed. This business struggles to generate profit at a rate better than 2% of net sales. Heck, if you exhibited that kind of performance, you'd be fired. Be honest!!

In other words, one can generously say that this is a business at a crossroads.

We need to continually ask an important question, one few are willing to ask.
  • "How will we acquire a new customer in 2020?"
Actual financials tell us that this business has hit an inflection point. Remember, somewhere between 80% and 95% (depending upon who you listen to) of all commerce happens offline, not online. So when online financials begin to lag, is it not natural to consider testing ideas offline? Wouldn't you do that, if you were smart? (and you are smart, so yes, you'd consider it).

This is reflective of the fact that all of the easy e-commerce growth is over. Done. 

Now the hard work begins to find new customers, anywhere. Blue Nile has been around long enough to have a loyal customer base that should be printing profit ... and that's not happening. So they have no choice but to find new customers in new ways. You'd do the same thing.

June 08, 2015

Dallas Cowboys: Virtual Reality Technology


Our marketing world is light years behind other industries. Go back to the Apollo 13 movie ... almost fifty years ago, NASA threw Ken in the simulator to figure out a startup procedure utilizing fewer amps than you use in your living room.

Here's what we need ... and heck, maybe I need to write the simulator myself ... if you are an enterprising person and have ideas, send me a message (kevinh@minethatdata.com) ... ok, back to what we need.

  • Program actual customer dynamics (rebuy rates, spend per repurchaser, new customers etc).
  • Program relationship between ad spend and demand generation, by marketing channel.
  • Program actual inter-channel dynamics (online customer buys in-store, becomes loyal store buyer).
  • Program liquidation dynamics (i.e. buy too much inventory, need to liquidate it, lose money in the process).
  • Program impact of "human issues" ... for example, by squeezing headcount, you cannot grow the business as fast or expand into new areas.
Now that the simulation is set, you, the user, get to turn the dials. Invest in customer acquisition ... invest in customer loyalty ... build an omnichannel brand ... focus on excellence within a single channel, you make the call. At the end of a year, you get to see the fruits of your labor. Or, you might decide to fire yourself!

At the end of five years, or ten years, your business will have evolved along a trajectory that would be different than how another individual, running the exact same simulation, would see their business evolve (because everybody would make different investment decisions).

Why would the simulator be important?

Well, you'd get to test your hypotheses before randomly trying stuff that would destroy the brand you work for. If you think that omnichannel is the best strategy, go, make it happen ... but then be sure to compare how the business evolves against a business strategy of maximizing one channel at the expense of others. 

Ok, tell me what you think. Do you think our industry needs a simulator? If you agree, what needs to be programmed into the simulator? How much would you pay for a simulator? Let me know your thoughts (kevinh@minethatdata.com).



June 07, 2015

Burger King Dude and Renting/Tolls/Advertising

Money and power align with social media and engagement. Take a look:




I know, I know, you're saying, "wait, you mean people still watch television?"


And this also happens:
The entire omnichannel movement is about renting. Rent a name from Google. Rent a name from a Co-Op. Rent a name from a popular retargeting/remarketing brand. Rent 30 seconds on television. Rent the owner's box at a horse race in collaboration with television. Rent the name on Facebook. Rent intelligence from Axciom or Experian or Epsilon. Rent space "in the cloud". 

When times change, something is gained, and something is lost. In the omnichannel movement, you gain the promise of access to a customer across a near infinite number of channels. Google calls these "micro-moments" (click here). The gains, of course, are balanced by all that you lose. Your business is controlled by those who own access to the micro-moments. Burger King pays NBC for a modern version of "product placement", but they lose control of the interaction between product placement and social media. You rent the name from the Co-Op, but you lose control over "who" the Co-Op sends you (which is increasingly a 62 year old non-urban customer who greatly influences the future of your merchandising assortment, rendering it unshoppable to the 36 year old).

Ten years ago, you couldn't spend five minutes online without bumping into an article promoting the independence of the internet. You were told that you owned your own future, you controlled what happened next. Pundits gloated about the demise of large brands that controlled the message ... the "TV is dead, Comcast is dead, you don't need the gatekeeper when you own your own media platform" kind of narrative dominated ... until Comcast bought up your access to the internet. Ooops.

Commerce evolved as it always seems to evolve ... with gatekeepers selling rental opportunities, today labeled under an "omnichannel" umbrella that benefits those who sell rental opportunities.

Take a look at your profit and loss statement. What percentage of net sales do you spend on rental opportunities? Do you mail catalogs? Then you are essentially renting paper and printing services every single month, aren't you? Do you love Google or Facebook? Then you are renting digital names, no different than renting names via the Co-Ops. If more than 20% of your net sales are consumed by rental tolls, then you are fully at the mercy of the gatekeepers ... in that situation, the gatekeepers own the future of your business.

There is an opportunity to figure out how to own your own message. A Nordstrom (customer service) or Patagonia (environmental mission via creative) or Costco (low prices via exclusivity) all own their marketing message. I recall being stunned when I worked at Nordstrom and realized that their marketing budget (ten years ago, might be different today) was around 2.5% of net sales. Let that one sink in. Compare that to Macy's, both then and now. Is it any wonder that Nordstrom prints money while Macy's prints stories about omnichannel brilliance?

When you own your message, you don't have to pay as many omnichannel rental tolls, do you? When you pay fewer tolls, you have access to cash that you can invest in other opportunities. You get to a point where you don't have to pay rental tolls to put a clown in the owner's box at a sporting event.

June 04, 2015

Happy Friday!!

Life is not all gloom and doom. Sometimes, a wild pack of crazed Corgi pups are thrilled to see your catalog in the mailbox (click here if you don't see the video box).



June 03, 2015

Oh That Pesky West Coast Port Shutdown

Blame is a funny thing ... when business is good, you don't see a lot of blame being passed around. But when business does not meet expectations, well, somebody has to be blamed, and that somebody sure cannot be Macy's and/or Omnichannel Strategy. More on that in a moment.

Have you had a chance to read through statements from first quarter earnings reports? No? It's free information! Free! You love free! And the documents communicate what actually happened, not results from a survey of 1,339 likely shoppers.

Wal-Mart: US Comps = +1%. E-commerce growth = +20%. Sams Club comps were +0.4% after excluding the negative impact of fuel deflation.

Target: Comps = +2.3%, e-commerce growth = +38%, which comprised a full third of the total 2.3% comp growth (yes, retailers add e-commerce growth to comp growth, inflating perceived retail effectiveness).

Home Depot: US Comps = +7.1% (no talk of blaming a West Coast Port Shutdown here). Favorable (closer to normal) weather, favorable housing bounceback helped.

Costco: Comps = +1% ... comps were +5% if you exclude fuel deflation.

Lowes: Comps = +5.3% (again, no talk of blame here).

Best Buy: -0.7% comp ... major slowing in e-commerce growth (5.3% vs. 29.2% last year). By the way, keep the decelerating e-commerce comp in the back of your mind ... this is about to become a big problem for many, many retailers.

Macy's: Oh, Macy's. Blame. Everybody but the merchandising strategy is to be blamed. They blamed the West Coast Port Slowdown (wouldn't that impact their competition, or just about every retailer?). They blamed weather (though others praised weather). They blamed international tourists (wouldn't that impact the competition as well?). They blamed their own omnichannel staffing reorganization for a temporary disruption. Blame - Blame - Blame - Blame - Blame. Shouldn't omnichannel overcome all of these challenges? Didn't the pundits tell us that omnichannel is the secret to success? Doesn't Macy's self-proclaim themselves as "American's Omnichannel Store"? Then why all the blame? Why? Sales were down -0.7%.

Kohl's: Comps = +1.4% ... how does Kohl's grow sales in the same environment that Macy's blames for hurting sales? Discuss.

Staples: Total sales = -7%. True comps = -0.6%. Staples.com sales only grew by 1%. In North America, sales were down 10%, comps were down 3%, e-commerce was up only 3%. Again, nobody wants to talk about this, but the deceleration of e-commerce growth in retail is going to become a big story (a secret story, but a big story). Nobody wants to talk about outcomes that are opposite of those promised by the Omnichannel Thesis, even though companies are publicly telling us about their problems.

Sears: Ugh.

J.C. Penney: Comps = +3.4%. At this rate, it will take seven or eight years to make up for the 30% drops they experienced a few years ago, and by then, inflation will have set JCP back another 20%. This is the trap that dying brands faces (and believe me, I know something about this). If the dying brand wants to make a change, the change is hated by existing customers. If the dying brand wants to grow, it cannot grow, because existing customers are not capable of fueling growth. Either way, the dying brand struggles to fight the competition. Either way, outsiders say that they have the answers. Outsiders do not have the answers.

Nordstrom: Sales = +9.8% (got that, Macy's?). However, there's all sorts of less-than-optimal numbers buried in the metrics. 50% sales growth at Nordstromrack.com (good). Earnings Before Taxes dropped from 9.3% to 7.9% (may or may not be bad). Full-Line Store comps = +0.5%, while e-commerce growth = +20%. Since e-commerce growth is tucked into comps, this implies that Full-Line Store comps were negative (Macy's will like that). And Nordstrom Rack posted -0.2% cops vs. +6.4% last year (oh oh). Loyalty program growth was +11%, and represented 38% of sales. Given that comps are flat and/or down, this tells you that the Loyalty program isn't truly fueling incremental growth, but may instead funneling customer shift from non-loyalty tender to the loyalty program, which isn't the same thing as "generating loyalty".

TJX: Net sales = +6%, comps = +5%. No blame for weather or port shutdowns here. Isn't that interesting? Some businesses just plow forward, even though they deal with the same challenges other companies deal with.

Gap: #OhBoy. Gap = -10% comp on a -5% comp from last year. Bananna Republic = -8% comp on a -1% last year. Old Navy = +3%. Why do the brands who struggle so much praise omnichannel and get so much press about omnichannel?

Ross Stores: Sales = +10%. Comps = +5%. No talk of omnichannel. No blaming the west coast port slowdown. Sell something the customer wants to buy at a price the customer wants to pay.

Limited Brands: Sales = +5%, comps = +5%. Direct sales = -6% ... again, pay attention folks ... retail e-commerce growth is rapidly decelerating. Direct sales ... that's the website plus print marketing ... declined. Declined! Do you ever hear about that when reading anything in the trade journal / consultant / vendor ecosystem?

Foot Locker: Comps = +7.8% ... the most profitable quarter in company history. No blame, no discussion of omnichannel. Just unfettered success. Think about it.

American Eagle: Comps = +7% on top of a -10% last year. Gross Margins are improved. Gains came from AOV, not from more customers purchasing. You always want more customers purchasing, gains in AOV are always temporary. That being said, you always want to erase the bad taste of a -10% comp, so kudos are earned here.

Urban Outfitters:  Growth in all brands. Growth.

Chicos: David Dyer will retire in 2016. Sales +1.7%. Comps = -0.1%. Lots of omnichannel chatter (again, those who praise omnichannel so frequently correlate with lower sales performance, think about it), Chicos store comps were -2.3%.

DSW: Sales = +9.4%, comps = +5.1%. These folks say they were awarded the "Best Omnichannel Experience Award" at some eBay conference. So here's a case where omnichannel aligned with highly positive sales outcomes. Good job!

Abercrombie & Fitch: -9% comp, Hollister = -6% comp. 'Nuff said.

Aeropostale: Net sales = -20%. Comps = -11% vs. -13% last year. Guess what? They blamed weather and the west coast port slowdown on performance. But there was no west coast port slowdown the year prior, and weather was worse the year prior, and they posted equally horrific numbers a year prior. Hmmm. We need to start applying common logic to what we read.

Dillards: -10% comp. Yeesh.

Belk: +3.3% comp. Online = +36.7%. The companies farthest behind on e-commerce are generally posting monster online comps ... those who captured a ton of e-commerce volume early on have largely plateaued.

Dick's Sporting Goods: +1% comp.

Cabelas: Sales are increasing.

Read the 10-Q statements from retailers and e-commerce businesses. These documents outline business trends that few in the vendor / consultant / trade journal universe will acknowledge.

June 02, 2015

Buy Buttons

Google / Pinterest and others are introducing buy buttons.

As we've learned with Amazon, when your customer buys your merchandise on Amazon, your customer is half as likely to buy from you again as when your customer buys from your website.

What do you think will happen when the social folks install a toll booth between you and your customer?

The social folks are in the process of installing toll booths all around your business, reducing you to a glorified vendor. Is it any wonder that the omnichannel punditocracy loves this stuff?

For customers < age 35, this kind of stuff, or some variant of it, will simply be what mobile commerce becomes. For the vast majority of my client base, this is a toll that erodes the customer relationship and overall profitability. This is the way things evolve ... go back twenty years and you see a comparable deal with online eroding traditional cataloging.

A Cataloger Must-Read: New Customer Megatrends Threaten The Existing Business Model

These are the days you wish Don Libey still roamed the planet. He'd write something interesting and compelling ... half the industry would call for his head ("he's an #idiot, ignore him"), half the industry would realize he was right and would take action.

You read the story about the Orchard Brands acquisition, right? (click here please). Why don't we take an opportunity to think strategically, and not tactically, about commerce in general. Instead of talking about an acquisition, why don't we talk about a megatrend that threatens the existing catalog business model?

Think about this question, for a moment:
  • "How the heck are we going to acquire a new customer in 2020, or in 2025?"
Have you given this question any thought?

Smarter minds are already attacking the problem.

Let's use the vendor community as an example, so that you can understand what comes next. In the list world, all of the noted list brands (Millard, Mokrynski, those folks) were weakened by the co-ops, rolled up by large brands, and ultimately, they disappeared. In the end, four large co-ops rolled up what was once a thriving ecosystem of smaller brands. From 2005 - 2014, catalogers were at the mercy of the co-ops. That trend is changing. More on that later.

Let's use the catalog consulting ecosystem as an example. There used to be dozens upon dozens of noted catalog industry consultants. These folks worked independently, trying hard to find new clients ... hard work, indeed. Too hard for most. In the past eighteen months, these folks have been rolled-up (CohereOne as an example). Combined, they have clout that they did not have as independent forces. One consultant can bring a new client into the fold, and that new client can become a new client for other consultants as well, easing the hard work necessary to find new clients.

Let's use Etsy as an example. Think about how hard it is for a tiny business, doing $3,000 sales per year, to find new customers. It's close to impossible! Etsy rolls up small businesses, allowing each small business to leverage the new customer acquisition of other small businesses.

Let's use Amazon as an example. If I need to purchase a power inserter for my satellite dish, I go to Amazon (click here), and I find out that there are multiple vendors offering the same item. Amazon rolls up numerous vendors, creating a customer acquisition platform for each vendor, helping each vendor find new customers that would be difficult to find otherwise.

There are many online marketplaces, where the concept is to roll up new customer acquisition to benefit the entire ecosystem. eBay, Craigslist, Newegg, Sears, BestBuy, are all in the business of rolling up new customers across sellers.

In the app world, the concept is similar ... Uber and Airbnb come to mind. It's the same thing ... suppliers are rolled up and given access to new customers.

If you don't participate in an ecosystem where new customers are rolled up for you, then you have two choices.
  1. Sell something so amazing and so wonderful that customers have to have it, and happily spread the word for you via word-of-mouth. This is really, really hard to do.
  2. Pay a gatekeeper a toll. The gatekeepers include but are not limited to Google, Facebook, and in the catalog world, the Co-Ops.
Have you ever played a slot machine in a casino? This is a toll-based system. You pay a small toll in exchange for an opportunity to win big. If 100 people bring $100 into a casino and pay the tolls at the slot machine, almost all of the 100 people will eventually lose $100. That's what Google, Facebook, and for catalogers, the Co-Ops represent. They take a slice of the pie in exchange for access to customers. If you keep renting the same name from the Co-Ops, eventually, after two years, you've paid $1 each for access to each non-responsive customer. Think about it for a moment. If you have a 1% response rate across your co-ops, and you rent names 10 times a year, at the end of the year, about 90% of the names did not respond, and you pay $0.06 * 10 = $0.60 to 90% of the circulation ... obtaining nothing in return. That's a toll. Google works the same way.

In terms of the big picture, the cataloger has three choices.
  1. Sell something so amazing and so wonderful that customers have to have it, and happily spread the word for you.
  2. Pay a gatekeeper a toll.
  3. Partner with folks, in an effort to avoid paying tolls while minimizing fixed costs.
In the mobile world, it's all about #3 ... Uber and Airbnb are examples of avoiding tolls. If you drive people around in a Corolla, you're not selling something amazing. And you sure don't want to pay a gatekeeper a toll (i.e newspaper classified ads). So you partner with folks (Uber). Yes, the partnership leads to somebody being paid. Somebody always gets paid. But you understand the logic, right?

So what happens in the catalog world, going forward?

First, the cost structure for catalogers is unsustainable. You cannot consume 25% of net sales on paper. Cannot. Not when your online competition does not have to pay a 25% toll on net sales. It's impossible to compete, long-term. So you're going to see catalogers who evaluate any/every way possible to reduce this expense. Where is this expense greatest and least productive? New customer acquisition. Who collects the toll in new customer acquisition? The Co-Ops. Which business model would I least want to manage in 2025? The Co-Op business model. No doubt about it. The Co-Op business model is dying. Not today. But it doesn't exist in 2025 in the same structure it exists today.

Second, the payment of tolls places great pressure on fixed costs. When the tolls become too great, it is very difficult to remain profitable. Without the tolls, it is very difficult to find new customers. Consequently, something has to give. Either tolls, or fixed costs (or both).


A collection of catalog brands, an "ecosystem" if you will, can be rather advantageous.
  1. If Magellan needs new customers, Magellan can pay the Co-Ops a toll. Magellan can also prospect off of the Cuddledown list, should modelers be able to find responsive names on the Cuddledown list. How much of a toll does Magellan pay Cuddledown, in theory? None. How much of a toll does Magellan have to pay the Co-Ops? A lot.
  2. Over time, finance, human resources, distribution centers, call centers, information technology, these fixed cost aspects of the business can be consolidated. Consolidation yields a lower fixed cost structure.
  3. Ecosystem negotiated costs are less than independently negotiated costs. Does the paper rep want to give Potpourri Group a better deal than an individual $20,000,000 brand? Absolutely! Does Quad Graphics want to give Potpourri Group a better deal than the $20,000,000 brand? Most likely, the answer is yes.
A catalog ecosystem yields an opportunity to broaden growth via customer acquisition within the core prospect audience, without having to pay tolls to the Co-Ops, without having to deal with an onerous fixed cost structure. It's the same concept that Etsy applies to small marketers. It's the same concept that Uber applies to independent drivers.

Our world, our catalog world, is moving toward two ends of the bar bell.
  1. On the left hand side of the bar bell are large ecosystem brands who leverage shared customers, reduced tolls, and minimized fixed cost structures. Individual brands within the ecosystem are similar to individual brands in a Nordstrom store.
  2. On the right hand side of the bar bell are numerous small catalogers who provide products and services that are so exemplary that they do not need to pay tolls.
The middle of the bar bell is a place you don't want to be. You don't have access to the benefits of an ecosystem. You don't have exemplary products and services that generate sufficient profit and word-of-mouth so that you don't have to pay tolls. In the middle of the bar bell, you reside in a toll-riddled world with profit proportional to the circumference of the bar bell.

This megatrend threatens the existing business model. It has become terribly hard to acquire new customers, making it terribly hard to grow. Choices need to be made.

Now, the cataloger caught in the middle of the bar bell need not think "OMG, I need to be acquired, immediately." Instead, the cataloger caught in the middle of the bar bell simply needs to think.

How are you going to acquire a new customer in 2020 or in 2025?

If you are not part of a catalog ecosystem, who will you be dependent upon for finding new customers?

If you do not have products/services that enable you to bypass the toll-based system set up by Google / Facebook / Co-Ops / Others, who will you be dependent upon for finding new customers?

If you are stuck in the middle of the bar bell, you do have competitive advantages. What are those advantages? How do you use your advantages against either end of the bar bell?

Is it possible that a thousand catalogers could work together, as one self-organized ecosystem, to achieve the same outcome as The Potpourri Group? Yes. Will this ever happen? Only if the pain becomes severe enough to force action. If I were a standalone cataloger, I'd be running, not walking, down this path. If I were one of the remaining list vendors, I'd be running, not walking, my catalog clients down this path. This path can allow catalogers to bypass the Co-Op toll booth altogether.

It's time to think about the megatrends that are rattling catalog marketing, as we speak. It is time to think about one important question:
  • "How are you going to acquire a new customer in 2020, or in 2025"?

Content Creation

Here's the link . I realize many of you are stymied by creating content for your customers. Some of you would say the video above is poi...