January 11, 2015

Hippoman's Big And Tall: Turning The Dial Up To Eleven

Ok, here's what we know.

  1. Sales are down, considerably.
  2. Profit (albeit marginal) has turned into a loss.
  3. New products were scaled way, way, way back, or performed horrifically bad, or both.
  4. Management appeared to invest in new customers for a brief period of time, propping up the business.
  5. When new customers were scaled back (hypothesis to be proved later), and when new items were scaled back, the business imploded.
  6. Repurchase rates cratered in 2014 (maybe because of new item issues), but repurchase rates are very low to begin with, causing the business to be highly dependent upon new customers for survival.
Let's look at trends in customer purchases over the past few years. Here's a view of annual purchase frequency.


Poor Mr. Hippoman. In four years, the average customer is purchasing 0.1 times less per year, down from about 1.375 to less than 1.275 orders per year. Now, that's not the end of the world, as long as other metrics change in a positive manner.

Here's items per order.


Geez.

When items per order is in decline (especially this much), I often find that price per item purchased is increasing.


There it is!

Notice that items per order improved late in 2014, at the exact time that price per item purchased leveled off. These two metrics frequently move in inverse proportion to each other. It's almost like the customer has $100 to spend, and if you raise prices, the customer purchases fewer items.

Items per order and price per item purchased yield average order value.


Remember, annual purchase frequency was in decline - but average order value is, on average, increasing. The multiplication of the two metrics give us annual customer spend.


This happens ALL THE TIME, folks. Everybody is trying to manage different metrics, in an attempt to grow the business. A merchant raises prices, causing the customer to purchase less often and to buy fewer items. The marketer responds by offering promotions to increase the probability of purchasing, but then the customer becomes hooked on promotions, causing the merchant to raise prices to improve profit margins, lowering purchase frequency and items per order even more. Everybody is turning dials on the stereo receiver to 11, only to get the graph above - essentially a flat-line. In four years, inflation would be enough to cause customers to spend an additional $10 per year (in this case) - but we don't see that happening, do we?

Again - everybody is turning stereo dials at the same time, up to eleven, but nothing is happening. It's like moving each band on the equalizer to maximum, causing the same tone you'd get if everything was at zero.

Mr. Hippoman seems to be leading a business in a chaotic manner, don't you think? Everybody is trying "something", but nothing positive is happening.

January 10, 2015

Describing What Is Happening In Retail - It's A Lot Like Cataloging, A Decade Later

Here's one for you, to kick off your weekend ... a story about Dying Malls (click here).

I ask you to read the article, of course, because the article de-emphasizes the effect of online sales in the deterioration of retail. The article instead focuses on the impact of too many stores, too much square footage, and not enough middle income demand to pay for all the square footage.

Everything we are seeing in retail in 2015 we saw in cataloging in 2005. We are simply choosing to ignore the past.

Now, I built a successful consulting practice by not being a futurist, but instead by identifying trends that are 1-3 years away, and then finding profitable ways to deal with the trends only for the companies who are open minded enough to consider the near-term future. The current trend in retail mirrors the past decade of cataloging so closely that it is embarrassing. 

Most of us cannot see the trend, because our financial incentives are designed to not allow us to see the trend.

Today, I share the trend with you.

Ten years ago in catalog marketing, the trend was "multichannel". You had to sell online, and you had to sell via a catalog. Those who did both were deemed winners. The rest were told that they were "dead". But is turns out that multichannel actually killed businesses. Multichannel was like chemotherapy. The solution was needed to keep the patient alive, but once the online channel was developed, the continuation of the solution actually poisoned the patient. 

How?

In cataloging, you have pages. Online/Digital hates inefficiency. Pages are inefficient - they are not appealing to all customers, are they? Over time, with decades of constant messaging telling the customer to go online, we trained existing catalog customers (mostly Judy, some Jennifer) to shop online, rendering half of all the pages mailed inefficient. We all lived through this transition, didn't we? Since 2007, more than 40% of all printed catalog pages are no longer mailed. In my projects, online customers are 50% to 70% organic, meaning that the printed page only drives 30% to 50% of the sales for that customer (vs. 100% fifteen years ago).

And worse, online trained an entire generation of customers (Jennifer) to stop shopping catalogs (and to instead shop with Amazon). In most of my projects, half of the population is younger than 45 ... but 85% of the catalog customer file is older than 45 years old. Multichannel cut off the bottom half of the population from catalogers, making it terribly hard for catalogers to grow. Eventually, the catalog customer file and merchandise assortment became disconnected from the overall population.

In other words, multichannel digitization destroyed catalog marketing, the opposite of the promised outcome.
  1. Marginal circulation became unprofitable circulation, and was removed from the marketing ecosystem.
  2. Pages in catalogs were trimmed, because pages became unprofitable. More pages were removed from the marketing ecosystem.
  3. Weak catalogers simply went out of business - they couldn't adapt fast enough. Their remains were purchased by private equity and catalog portfolio brands.
  4. Multichannel alignment caused a rapid evolution of the merchandise assortment toward "core customers", causing anybody under the age of 45 to not like the catalog merchandise assortment. Co-ops accelerated this trend by funneling 55-65 year old customers to catalogers. Judy loved this, and kept shopping with catalogers. Jennifer hated this, and chose Amazon instead.
  5. More than 40% of the pages mailed eight years ago are gone today.
Now on to retail.

Catalog Pages = Retail Square Footage.

Catalog Multichannel = Retail Omnichannel.

Catalog Ineffectiveness With Jennifer = Retail Ineffectiveness With Jasmine.

Today, you're told that you must be "omnichannel" or you are dead. There are myriad experts promoting the omnichannel thesis, using Macy's as the poster child for success, a company that can't grow in-store sales and is closing $130,000,000 of sales across 14 stores because those in-store sales have become unprofitable. That's what success looks like.

In retail, omnichannel means full digitization. You have to have a strong online presence. You have to have a strong mobile presence. You have to have a strong social media presence. You have to digitize the in-store experience with beacons or any other form of technology designed to make vendors profit. You have to do these things, or you are "dead".

And retailers have dived-in, head-first, no, not to the level required by the experts who get paid when retailers dive-in, but let's be honest - when Sears does north of four billion dollars online, when Macy's does more than four billion dollars online and a billion from items shipped home from stores, we have proof that retailers dived-in, head-first.

One little problem.

Digital hates inefficiency. Hates it. Renders it useless. Digital destroyed nearly half of all catalog pages, rendering them unprofitable. In omnichannel, we're seeing the exact same trend. There were too many square feet of shopping space to begin with. So a 10% hit to retail sales, thanks to omnichannel initiatives designed to drive the customer online, renders a break-even square foot an unprofitable square foot. Malls are dying. Retailers are going to shrink their in-store portfolio - I see 30%, and I will undoubtedly be wrong ... it might be 10%, it might be 50% ... but it will happen. It is happening. Online renders marginal in-store square footage unprofitable. Period.

Worse, omnichannel is yielding the same outcome in retail that multichannel yielded in cataloging. If you are Macy's, you are actively analyzing the average age of the customer shopping your business. Your customer is getting "older". See, when you digitize your business, you digitize it for your core customer. As a result, your core customer appreciates the digitization of the business, and buys merchandise that core customers like. This dynamic cuts off the younger portion of the customer file.

This dynamic is playing out all across retail - exaggerated in brands like Aeropostale and Wet Seal, where digitization cut out the younger fast-fashion mobile audience.

For catalogers, Amazon's merchandising approach captured a younger audience, cutting the younger audience out from catalogers. For retailers, fast fashion (yes, merchandise always wins) and mobile cut out a younger audience from retailers anxiously digitizing the business for e-commerce success.

Omnichannel is like chemotherapy. It appears to cure the cancer afflicting retailers. But once chemotherapy has been applied and the patient is "cured", continued application poisons the customer.

Poison is coming to retail.

Macy's is closing stores.

JCP is closing stores.

Coldwater Creek - dead.

Sears is dying, has been for a long time.

Aeropostale and Wet Seal and many other younger brands who focused on old-school e-commerce and merchandising techniques are losing out to fast-fashion mobile techniques that cater to younger customers.

Office Depot and Office Max merged. Pay close attention to the store count, folks.

Healthy companies like Nordstrom are no longer opening Full-Line Stores. Let that one sink in for a moment.

Pier 1 is going to "rationalize" the store portfolio, with 60% of store leases up in the next three years.

30% of retail square footage is going to go away. Just run the numbers, you'll see it yourself, you cannot help but see the reality of what is coming. You have to be an omnichannel brand, and the outcome won't be positive. But if you don't go down the omnichannel path, you're toast anyway. So maybe the answer isn't omnichannel (clearly, it isn't). Maybe, the answer is merchandise.

H&M / Zara and others thrive ... they chose merchandise brilliance over channel brilliance. Yes, you can be highly successful in retail. There will be many winners, just like in cataloging, where we saw many winners as well (but far, far more losers).

I could go on and on, forever. Your homework assignment is to go read SEC filings and Press Releases from leading retailers - the message is contrary to the narrative we're being sold.

For you, the catalog / retail / e-commerce reader of this blog? There is plenty of reason for optimism. Plenty.

Big malls & the best shopping centers will only get bigger and better. The internet is destroying anything average, the internet rewards big. Your omnichannel dreams will come true for the top 20% of your locations.

Then the rules change. For everybody else ...

Your problem isn't that customers need more channels to buy your merchandise. Everybody markets through numerous channels. That's not the issue.

Your problem is merchandise (vendors make money by selling you omnichannel solutions - you make money by selling merchandise). There are two problems, one of the problems applies to your business.
  1. Your core audience does not like your merchandise assortment.
  2. Younger customers do not like your merchandise assortment.
There is plenty of room for optimism. Focus on merchandise. Solve (1), and you'll be highly profitable for a decade. Solve (2) and you can own the next two decades. There's a ton of business to be had. Go make it happen!

And create a great experience. You don't hear Williams Sonoma moaning about the future - and they send catalogs ... catalogs for crying out loud! They're successful. They create in-store reasons for customers to visit a store. They cater to their core audience. Their merchandising and entertainment strategy cause customers to purchase, making channel strategy appear profitable. But without the merchandising / entertainment strategy, their channel strategy is rendered pointless.

More than 80% of the Merchandise Forensics projects I've worked on illustrate merchandising problems that are costing the business +/- 10% of annual sales - enough sales to generate enough profit to override the impact of digital on store performance. This is where our focus needs to be. We fix merchandise, we generate profit, and we can ignore this whole essay - my entire essay is irrelevant if we improve merchandise productivity.

Focus on merchandise. Focus on your entertainment strategy. You can be profitable catering to your core audience. You can attract a younger audience. It's up to you! Go do it!

January 08, 2015

Macy's: #Omnichannel = Closing Stores, Laying Off 2,200

Give this one a read ... click here.

Highlights:
I spent a full year talking about how this is the logical outcome of omnichannel strategy. You've been there with me, all year, on this journey. I sincerely appreciate your loyalty.

Digital is tough, folks. There are unanticipated outcomes. We humans are not good at forecasting three steps ahead when we have a vested interest in making sure that whatever happens one step ahead aligns with our worldview.

Here's the thing about digital. Digital ruthlessly attacks offline inefficiency. We spent a full decade, bombing customers with 10,000 to 100,000 (or more) marketing messages, telling the customer to stop visiting stores. Is it any wonder that half of store purchases start with online research? Is it any wonder in-store traffic is in the toilet?

We need to have an honest discussion about what is coming, folks.

Hippoman's Big And Tall: Customer Loyalty

I want you to look at the annual repurchase metrics at Hippoman's Big And Tall:
  • 2014 = 22.7%.
  • 2013 = 26.2%.
  • 2012 = 26.9%.
  • 2011 = 25.1%.
Tell me what you see, here. Go ahead, think about it for a moment, I'll wait for you.

Two things should stand out.
  1. Repurchase rates collapsed in the past twelve months. That's a problem. That's the obvious trend.
  2. Annual repurchase rates are really, really low (and that's not uncommon).
This is the part of a project I hesitate to communicate to folks. You see, when the facts are shared (low annual repurchase rate), the majority of folks who hear this news think they can "fix" annual repurchase rates.

Nobody is going to "fix" annual repurchase rates. Nobody.

Each business possesses unique dynamics. Wal-Mart is able to get customers to purchase 35-40 times per year, that's a key component of their business model. At Nordstrom, we kept 75% of last year's purchasers. At Eddie Bauer, back in the day, it was around 50%. At Lands' End, in 1990, it was 60%. All three of those businesses sold merchandise that gave the customer a reason to buy frequently ... 6 times a year at Nordstrom ... 3 times a year at Lands' End ... 2 times a year at Eddie Bauer.

There is a direct correlation between "need to purchase" and "annual repurchase rate".

I work with countless businesses that have a customer base with a 25% annual repurchase rate ... these businesses are often highly profitable.

In this case, I'll share the data with Mr. Hippoman. I will tell Mr. Hippoman that when he "fixes" his business, his annual repurchase rate will be lucky to be 30%. I'll tell Mr. Hippoman that this means his business must be in a constant, unending quest to find new customers at a very low cost.

And Mr. Hippoman, in all likelihood, will tell me that he and his merchandising team need to "fix" this problem - he'll tell me that they need to put in a loyalty program to get the repurchase rate up to 50%. He'll tell me that competitors have high rates (50%), so his low rate is a reflection of a failure of his team to run the business properly.

Mr. Hippoman will be wrong. He created a business that is designed to encourage customers to buy every 2-3 years, not every 2-3 months. The merchandise assortment is likely to be aligned with infrequent purchase cycles ... it's hard to fix that. You don't need to fix that, either. You just need to find new customers and generate profit on most transactions.

January 07, 2015

Hippoman's Big And Tall: Customer Metric Problems

So far, we have a profit and loss statement that looks very gloomy in 2014, and we have new item productivity that is completely in the tank in 2014.

This graph illustrates the number of rolling twelve month buyers. On average, the trend is highly negative.

But notice the blip that started late in 2012, and carried through mid 2013.

This is a tell-tale signature, folks. This tells me that somebody in marketing tried to manipulate poor business performance by trying to acquire a lot of new customers.

I want to show you another trend I uncovered in the data. Take a look at the average price of an item purchased by customers.


We've just uncovered two strategies, employed by Management, to keep the business moving forward.

  1. From late 2012 to mid 2013, Management tried to grow the business by investing in new buyers.
  2. From late 2013 through mid 2014, Management tried to grow the business by raising prices.
Tomorrow, we'll take a look at another series of customer metrics, designed to help us understand what is happening with this business.


January 06, 2015

Hippoman's Big And Tall: Product Problems

After what I've observed over the past three years, I've learned to immediately analyze demand generated from new items. It's the first thing I try to do, and for good reason ... look at what we see here.

This graph illustrates rolling twelve month demand from new items. The item had to be new in the past year to be counted in this graph.

What do you observe?

Well, demand from new items held reasonably constant, at +/- $10,000,000 per year, through late 2013. Then, in early 2014, something happened. Either new item development was cut, or the merchants responsible for new items suffered through a horrific productivity meltdown. Through most of 2014, new items performed at +/- $7,000,000 per year.

Remember, this business was down about $4,700,000, between 2013 and 2014.

Already, by running just one graph, we've identified a big problem, haven't we?

Now, if the existing item graph looks similar, then something else is going on. Let's look at existing items.


Well, existing items are not performing well, but their performance is more in-line with the three year trend, isn't it? Interestingly, existing item performance absolutely cratered back in 2011. Mr. Hippoman's team did something back then to discontinue a bunch of existing items, or we wouldn't observe a trend that looks like the trend we're seeing in this graph.

Tomorrow, we'll see if there are merchandising issues that can be identified through customer metrics.

January 05, 2015

Hippoman's Big And Tall: The Profit And Loss Statement

Take a look at the profit and loss statement, folks.

It's not pretty, is it?

Poor Mr. Hippoman.

Net sales are on the decline ... down 12% vs. 2013. And let's be honest, 2013 wasn't exactly a glorious year, was it?

Gross Margin percentages are reasonably constant, so at least Hippoman has that going for him.

Look at marketing expenses - this represents online marketing and print marketing. The numbers are increasing, suggesting that there is a genuine merchandise productivity issue harming the business.

Pick / Pack / Ship expenses, which also include free shipping, are 10.4% of net sales ... and were 9.9% two years ago, so this isn't a case of a serious ramp-up in promotional activity draining the profit and loss statement.

As one might expect, fixed costs are increasing at an inflationary rate.

So in total, a weak business (4.5% Earnings Before Taxes in 2012) has become an unprofitable business. Is it any wonder that Harold Hippoman wants to understand what is going on here?

Wow.

Tomorrow, we'll start to dig into customer data, trying to understand just what the heck happened in the past year to cause demand to plummet.

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